Expletive agreement, evidentiality, and modality in Logooli by Gluckman, John & Bowler, Margit
Proceedings of SALT 26: 1063–1082, 2016
Expletive agreement, evidentiality, and modality in Logooli *
John Gluckman
UCLA
Margit Bowler
UCLA
Abstract We discuss and analyze two subject agreement markers in Logooli (Bantu,
Kenya). We show that e- (class 9 subject agreement) and ga- (class 6 subject
agreement) give rise to a variety of apparently evidential or modal meanings when
they occur in constructions translated with “expletive” subjects. We propose a
treatment of the Logooli data following Matthewson, Rullmann & Davis’s (2007)
and Rullmann, Matthewson, & Davis’s (2008) choice function analysis of modality
and evidentiality in St’át’imcets, and extend their original proposal to account for
novel data in Logooli. We show that these two morphemes occur only with verbs
that introduce modal bases, and propose that they differ from one another in the size
of the subset of possible worlds that their associated choice functions select from
the modal base. This in turn results in different interpretations based on the size of
the subset of worlds that they select, the speaker’s ordering source, and the modal
base provided by the verb.
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Logooli (Bantu, Kenya) has two subject agreement markers, e- and ga-, that
productively mark noun class 9 and noun class 6 subject agreement, respectively:1
(1) a. i-Noombe
9-cow
e-futi-ki
9-inflate-AC
‘The cow inflated’2
* We would like to thank our wonderful Logooli consultant, Mwabeni Indire, for generously sharing
his time and his language with us. Thanks also to Yael Sharvit, Maayan Abenina-Adar, and audience
members at SALT 26, ACAL 47, UCLA Semantics Tea, and the UCLA American Indian Seminar.
We particularly thank Mike Diercks, Mary Paster, and Meredith Landman at Pomona College for
their generosity and expertise in all things Logooli. This research was funded in part by NSF GRFP
grant DGE-1144087, and a Lenart Graduate Travel Fellowship. All errors are our own.
1 Logooli (also called Luragooli, Maragoli, and Lulogooli, among other names) is a Bantu language in
the Luhia subfamily. It is spoken in western Kenya and Tanzania by around 600,000 people (Lewis,
Simons & Fennig 2016). Logooli exhibits a range of phenomena that are typically associated with
Bantu languages, including two tones and a complex tense/aspect system. We ignore both for the
purpose of this paper. See Leung (1991) and Samuels & Paster (2015) for discussions of Logooli
tone.
2 The following abbreviations are used in this paper:
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b. ami-ino
6-tooth
ga-gw-E
6-fall-FV
‘The teeth fell’
However, these agreement markers also occur in response to prompts with
expletive subjects. This occurs despite the fact that the utterances do not include
either class 6 or class 9 subjects:
(2) a. e-ror-ek-a
9-look-AC-FV
ndee
that
Sira
1Sira
a-gw-E
1-fall-FV
‘It looks like Sira fell’
b. ga-ror-ek-a
6-look-AC-FV
ndee
that
Sira
1Sira
a-gw-E
1-fall-FV
‘It looks like Sira fell’
When e- and ga- occur in constructions like (2), the morphemes contribute
additional meanings to the utterance. These meanings vary in part based on the
verb that the agreement markers combine with; they can include marking direct
versus indirect speaker perception of the evidence for the embedded proposition P,
widespread versus restricted knowledge of P, and modal force, among other things.
That is, even though e- and ga- might be referred to as marking an “expletive”
subject, they clearly contribute something semantically non-trivial.3
In this paper, we provide an analysis of e- and ga- in the spirit of Matthewson
et al.’s (2007) and Rullmann et al.’s (2008) treatment of modality and evidentiality
in St’át’imcets (henceforth, RMD). Following RMD, we propose that e- and ga-
are associated with choice functions that operate over the best possible worlds in
the modal base as supplied by the verb and restricted by the contextually supplied
ordering source. e- and ga- differ in the size of the subset that this choice function
selects; conceptually speaking, ga- picks out a larger subset of worlds in the modal
base than e-.
In the following sections, we show how this accounts for the various interpreta-
tions of e- and ga-, ranging from evidential to modal. This project also represents a
1-17 : class markers
SG/PL : singular/plural
AC : anticausative
CAUS : causative
COP : copula
FUT : future
FV : final vowel
NEG : negative
PASS : passive
POSS : possessive
PROG : progressive
PRT : particle
REC : reciprocal
REFL : reflexive
Logooli has approximately 17 noun classes. We use numbers to gloss these classes, following
Bantuist convention.
3 Syntactic theories typically treat English expletive subjects (also called “pleonastic subjects”) as
semantically vacuous, although it has also been argued for English that expletive subjects may
contribute evidential-like semantics (e.g., Grimm (2006), among others).
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first pass at examining evidentiality in Bantu, a topic that is not yet well described or
understood.
1 Logooli data
In the following sections, we report the interpretations of e- and ga- in combination
with various semantic classes of verbs. In section 2, we give our proposal and walk
through a Logooli example according to this analysis. In section 3, we discuss the
predictions of our analysis.
1.1 Indirect (e-) versus direct (ga-) perception
In combination with verbs of perception like kufana ‘to seem’ and kuroreka ‘to
appear,’ the use of e- conveys that the speaker has indirectly perceived evidence for
the truth of the embedded proposition. Conversely, ga- conveys that the speaker has
directly perceived evidence for the truth of the proposition:4
(3) Context: It’s flu season, and Imali didn’t come to school. The speaker says:
a. e-fan-a
9-seem-FV
kuresa
like
Imali
1Imali
a-saal-a
1-be.sick-FV
‘It seems like Imali is sick’
b. # ga-fan-a
6-seem-FV
kuresa
like
Imali
1Imali
a-saal-a
1-be.sick-FV
‘It seems like Imali is sick’
(4) Context: The speaker sees Imali coughing and sneezing. They say:
a. ? e-fan-a
9-seem-FV
kuresa
like
Imali
1Imali
a-saal-a
1-be.sick-FV
‘It seems like Imali is sick’
b. ga-fan-a
6-seem-FV
kuresa
like
Imali
1Imali
a-saal-a
1-be.sick-FV
‘It seems like Imali is sick’
Speaker’s comment: “(4b) is only appropriate if you’re looking at Imali.”
Our consultant noted that it’s not completely infelicitous to use (4a) in the context
in (4). This is because it is also possible that Imali’s sneezing and coughing is due
4 In this paper, we ignore the various “detransitivizing” verbal suffixes that can co-occur with e- and
ga-. These can include (exclusively) the anticausative -Vk, the passive -w, and the reciprocal -an (in
combination with the anticausative). The contributions of these suffixes in the expletive constructions
are not yet well understood (cf. Seidl & Dimitriadis 2003).
1065
Gluckman & Bowler
to allergies, rather than to sickness. Since even direct perception is still compatible
with speaker doubt, the use of e- in this context is still available. What is crucial,
however, is that the direct perception in the context in (4) enables the speaker to use
ga- and make the strongest claim possible, unlike in (3).
As a first pass, the data in (3-4) might seem to support an evidential analysis of
e- and ga-. However, data in the following provides evidence against this treatment.
We further address why a purely evidential analysis cannot account for the Logooli
data in subsection 3.2.
1.2 Restricted (e-) versus general (ga-) knowledge
In combination with attitude report verbs like kumanyeka ‘to be known,’ kusoverwa
‘to be believed,’ and kuvoleka ‘to be said,’ e- conveys that a proposition is “privi-
leged” or “restricted” knowledge. Conversely, ga- conveys “general” knowledge.
Our consultant sometimes indicates this by glossing his Logooli utterances with “It
is not widely {known / believed / said} that P” and “It is widely {known / believed /
said} that P” for e- and ga-, respectively:
(5) a. ga-many-ek-a
6-know-AC-FV
ndee
that
Kurt
Kurt
Cobain
Cobain
y-i-isuNga
1-REFL-kill
‘It is (well) known that Kurt Cobain killed himself’
b. e-many-ek-an-i
9-known-AC-REC-FV
ndee
that
Kurt
Kurt
Cobain
Cobain
y-aremban-a
1-argue-FV
na
PRT
m-kari
1-wife
w-evE
1-POSS
‘It is (not well) known that Kurt Cobain argued with his wife’
The speaker need not have witnessed either the death of Kurt Cobain, or Kurt
Cobain arguing with his wife, to felicitously utter (5a) or (5b). Instead, the speaker
is merely relating the information that he knows, not relating how he acquired the
information. This contrasts with the use of e- and ga- in combination with the
perception verbs in subsection 1.1.
1.3 Less affectedness (e-) versus more affectedness (ga-)
In combination with emotive factive predicates like kurereriza ‘to be sad,’ kufuniza
‘to be surprised,’ and kugenia ‘to be odd’/‘to be strange,’ e- expresses that the speaker
is less affected in terms of the relative emotion, while ga- expresses that the speaker
is extremely affected in terms of the relative emotion:5
5 These verbs form a natural class only when they occur with an expletive subject; John is sad reports
John’s emotional state, whereas John is odd reports the speaker’s attitude towards John.
1066
Expletive agreement, evidentiality, and modality in Logooli
(6) Context: Maina is a huge Lakers fan. If the Lakers lose a game, he can say:
a. # e-verer-iz-a
9-be.sad-CAUS-FV
ndee
that
Lakers
2Lakers
va-goot-w-i
2-defeat-PASS-FV
‘It’s sad that the Lakers lost’6
b. ga-verer-iz-a
6-be.sad-CAUS-FV
ndee
that
Lakers
2Lakers
va-goot-w-i
2-defeat-PASS-FV
‘It’s sad that the Lakers lost’
(7) Context: Sira is a casual Lakers fan. If the Lakers lose a game, he can say:
a. e-verer-iz-a
9-be.sad-CAUS-FV
ndee
that
Lakers
2Lakers
va-goot-w-i
2-defeat-PASS-FV
‘It’s sad that the Lakers lost’
b. # ga-verer-iz-a
6-be.sad-CAUS-FV
ndee
that
Lakers
2Lakers
va-goot-w-i
2-defeat-PASS-FV
‘It’s sad that the Lakers lost’
Note that the contrast between (6) and (7) has nothing to do with whether the
speaker has (in)direct evidence for the proposition, or whether the information is
widely known or not. This usage of e- and ga- to express “speaker affectedness” is
distinct from the two previous uses.
1.4 Weaker modal force (e-) and stronger modal force (ga-)
In combination with modal verbs, e- signals weak modal force, whereas ga- signals
strong modal force.7 As shown in the following examples, our consultant sometimes
glosses his Logooli utterances with “should” (for e-) and “must” (for ga-):
(8) Context: A school-age child is skipping school. He runs into another child
skipping school, who tells him:
a. e-dukan-a
9-arrive-FV
ndee
that
u-zi-E
2sg-go-FV
m-skolu
in-school
m-soom-e
PART-study-FV
Consultant’s gloss: ‘You should go to school.’
Literally: ‘It’s required that you go to school and study’
6 Literally: ‘It’s saddening that the Lakers were defeated.’
7 By “modal verbs,” we mean verbs that introduce modal bases ordered according to some contextually
supplied ordering source. The verb in (8)-(9), kudukana, is morphologically complex; it consists
of kuduka ‘to arrive’ together with the reciprocal suffix -an. Interestingly, we have not found any
Logooli verbs that have solely modal semantics. Instead, Logooli modal verbs have both modal and
non-modal uses. In addition to kudukana, these verbs include kunyala ‘to manage’/‘to be able,’ and
kwenyeka ‘to be wanted’/‘to be expected’/‘should.’
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b. # ga-dukan-a
6-arrive-FV
ndee
that
u-zi-E
2sg-go-FV
m-solu
in-school
m-soom-e
PRT-study-FV
Consultant’s gloss: ‘You must go to school.’
Literally: ‘It’s required that you go to school and study’
(9) Context: A school-age child is skipping school. He runs into a police officer,
who tells him:
a. # e-dukan-a
9-arrive-FV
ndee
that
u-zi-E
2sg-go-FV
m-skolu
in-school
m-soom-e
PART-study-FV
Consultant’s gloss: ‘You should go to school.’
Literally: ‘It’s required that you go to school and study’
b. ga-dukan-a
6-arrive-FV
ndee
that
u-zi-E
2sg-go-FV
m-solu
in-school
m-soom-e
PRT-study-FV
Consultant’s gloss: ‘You must go to school.’
Literally: ‘It’s required that you go to school and study’
Unlike the data in the previous sections, the use of e- and ga- in (8-9) does not
supply any information about directness or indirectness of evidence, generality of
knowledge, or speaker affectedness. Rather, the data in (8-9) strongly suggests that
e- and ga- interact with the modal base.
1.5 Summary
We summarize the contributions of e- and ga- with respect to the different classes of
predicates in Table 1 below. Given this range of meanings, our task now is to give a
compositional semantics for this data.
Perception Attitude Emotive
verbs report verbs factives Modals
e- indirect evidence restricted knowledge less affected weak
ga- direct evidence general knowledge more affected strong
Table 1 Summary of the contributions of e- and ga-.
2 Proposal: Choice functions operating over modal bases
Our proposal is in the spirit of RMD’s treatment of modality and evidentiality in
St’át’imcets. We propose that e- and ga- introduce choice functions, and follow
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RMD in assuming that choice functions can take a set as an argument and return
some subset of that set.8 In the case of e- and ga-, the choice function f associated
with these morphemes operates over the set of the best possible worlds as determined
by the ordering source. f takes this set of worlds as its argument and returns a subset
of these worlds. That is, for any set of possible worlds A, f (A)⊆ A.
Given this assumption, the expletives in Logooli must combine with a lexical
item that contributes a modal base for f to operate over.9 This is supported by the set
of Logooli verbs that e- and ga- can combine with; these verbs are typically treated
as being intensional. This set of verbs includes kumanyeka ‘to be known,’ kuvoleka
‘to be said,’ kufana ‘to seem like,’ and so on.
Following this proposal, we give a basic denotation for a Logooli modal verb:10
(10) J MODAL VERB Kw,OS,MB,ah =
λPstλ fst,st : OS is appropriate for MB and f is a choice function. ∀w′[w′ ∈
f (BESTOS(ah,w)(MB(ah,w)))→ P(w′) = 1]
In this denotation, Logooli modal verbs combine with an embedded proposition
P and a choice function f . P is true in all of the worlds picked by the choice function
from the set of best possible worlds determined by the speaker’s modal base and
ordering source. In (11), existential closure is provided at the top of the tree.
(11)
∃ f TP<t>
f<st,st> VP<<st,st>,t>
V<<st>,<<st,st>,t>> CP<st>
We crucially propose that ga- and e- differ in the size of the set of possible worlds
that they select. The stronger of the two morphemes, ga-, selects a non-proper and
non-empty subset of the best possible worlds in the modal base: that is, it returns the
same set of best possible worlds. This effectively amounts to universal quantification.
When a speaker uses ga-, they make a strong claim; they assert that the embedded
proposition P is true in all the best possible worlds in the modal base.
8 Choice functions were initially proposed by Reinhart (1997) to take a set and return an element from
that set. This was used to account for the interpretation of indefinite DPs.
9 We assume a traditional definition of a modal base as a set of worlds accessible from the actual world
ordered according to some contextually supplied ordering source (following Kratzer 1991, Hacquard
2011, among many others).
10 We abbreviate “ordering source” as OS, “modal base” as MB, and “attitude holder” as ah.
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Conversely, when a speaker uses e-, they make a weaker claim. We propose that
e- simply selects a non-empty subset of the best possible worlds in the modal base.
In contrast to ga-, e- amounts to existential quantification. That is, e- asserts that
there is some world in the modal base in which P is true.
Given this difference in strength, we propose that the choice functions e- and
ga- form the scale 〈e-,ga-〉. Since e- is weaker than ga-, if f in (11) is occupied by
e-, the utterance is strengthened through scalar implicature to the meaning “e- and
not ga-.” (We remain agnostic as to which mechanism should be used to derive this
scalar implicature.) This strengthened meaning is in accordance with our Logooli
consultant’s observation that it is generally infelicitous to use e- in contexts in which
ga- is licensed.11 On the other hand, since there is no stronger scalar alternative to
ga-, utterances containing ga- in f cannot be further strengthened. It is infelicitous
to use ga- in contexts in which e- is licensed simply because it makes too strong of
an assertion.
2.1 Walkthrough of an example according to our analysis
The following sentences give examples of e- and ga- in combination with kuholeka
‘to hear.’ In these examples, the stronger morpheme, ga-, is used to indicate that the
speaker has direct evidence for the embedded proposition. Conversely, the weaker
morpheme, e-, is used to indicate indirect evidence.
(12) Context #1: The speaker heard a loud party happening next door to their
apartment; that is, they have direct evidence for the embedded proposition.
They say:
a. ga-hol-ek-a
6-hear-AC-FV
kuresa
like
vu-geni
15-party
vu-are
15-COP
vu-rahe
15-good
‘It sounds like the party was fun’
b. # e-hol-ek-a
9-hear-AC-FV
kuresa
like
vu-geni
15-party
vu-are
15-COP
vu-rahe
15-good
‘It sounds like the party was fun’
In (12), the speaker’s modal base contains all the worlds that are compatible
with what they have heard. This includes things like loud music, singing, shouting,
and so on. These worlds within their modal base are then ordered according to their
ordering source, which includes facts like “Parties with loud music are fun,” “Parties
with singing are fun,” and so on. In the context in (12), the embedded proposition
The party was fun is true in all of the best worlds in the speaker’s modal base, as
11 One noteworthy exception to this is (4), as previously mentioned.
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determined by these facts. The speaker therefore uses ga- to indicate that P is true in
all of these worlds.12
(13) Context #2: The speaker’s friend tells them that a party he attended was fun.
However, the speaker did not attend or overhear the party themselves; they
only have indirect evidence for the embedded proposition. They say:
a. # ga-hol-ek-a
6-hear-AC-FV
kuresa
like
vu-geni
15-party
vu-are
15-COP
vu-rahe
15-good
‘It sounds like the party was fun’
b. e-hol-ek-a
9-hear-AC-FV
kuresa
like
vu-geni
15-party
vu-are
15-COP
vu-rahe
15-good
‘It sounds like the party was fun’
In (13), the speaker’s modal base contains all the worlds that are compatible
with what their friend has told them; that is, that the party was fun. However, the
facts within the speaker’s ordering source that determine the best possible worlds
differs from in (12). In this case, the speaker’s ordering source includes facts like
“The speaker’s friend enjoys crowded parties, but the speaker does not,” “People
generally think that parties with loud music are fun, but the speaker doesn’t like loud
music,” “Secondhand information is generally unreliable,” and so on. Given this
context and ordering source, the best worlds in the speaker’s modal base includes
worlds in which the embedded proposition (The party was fun) is false. The speaker
therefore uses e- to indicate that the set of best possible worlds in their modal base
also includes worlds in which P is false.
The interpretation of e- and ga- as marking indirect versus direct evidence in (12-
13) falls out from a combination of the speaker’s ordering source and the contents
of their modal base, as determined by the verb kuholeka ‘to hear.’ This is a verb of
perception, meaning that the best possible worlds in the modal base should reflect
the perceptual evidence that the speaker receives from the actual world. When e-
and ga- are used in combination with such a verb of perception, their choice reflects
whether the perceptual evidence in their set of best possible worlds supports the
truth of P, vis-a-vis their ordering source. We propose that a similar analysis holds
for attitude report verbs, emotive factives, and modals.
3 Predictions of the analysis
In the following sections, we review some of the predictions that our analysis makes,
and show that they are supported by Logooli data.
12 We assume that speakers do not use e- in this context because they are obligated to make the strongest
claim possible, given their evidence. This follows from Grice’s maxim of quantity (Grice 1975).
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3.1 Modifying the ordering source
The choice of e- versus ga- hinges on the contents of the best possible worlds in
the speaker’s modal base. Since this set of possible worlds is determined by the
speaker’s ordering source, altering the set of facts within their ordering source can
alter this set of best possible worlds. This in turn can affect the speaker’s choice of
e- versus ga-.
This is shown in the following example, in which two speakers must differ in
their choice of e- versus ga- due to having different ordering sources. The difference
in their ordering sources stems from their background knowledge, and not from any
difference in perceptual input:
(14) Context: Imali and Maina are watching Roger Federer play in a tennis
match. Imali is a huge tennis fan and knows all the rules and statistics of
the game. However, Maina is only vaguely familiar with the rules, and
otherwise knows nothing about tennis. Roger Federer just served an ace.
a. ga-ror-ek-a
6-look-AC-FV
kuresia
like
Federer
1Federer
a-kin-i
1-play-FV
vurahE
well
karono
today
‘It looks like Federer is playing well today’
Xif Imali says this, # if Maina says this
b. e-ror-ek-a
9-look-AC-FV
kuresia
like
Federer
1Federer
a-kin-i
1-play-FV
vurahE
well
karono
today
‘It looks like Federer is playing well today’
# if Imali says this,Xif Maina says this
Imali, the knowledgeable speaker, can only felicitously use ga- in this context.
This is because her ordering source contains the actual rules of tennis. She can
therefore accurately judge whether Federer is playing well or poorly, according to
these rules. Given her visual evidence, she uses ga- to make the strong claim that he
is playing well. That is, in all of the best possible worlds in Imali’s modal base, as
determined by her ordering source, Roger Federer is playing well.
Maina, the less knowledgeable speaker, can only felicitously use e-. This falls
out from the fact that his ordering source does not contain the actual rules of tennis.13
Since he does not know what makes a tennis player “good” in the actual world, there
are worlds in his modal base in which Roger Federer is not playing well according
to these actual rules. As a result, he uses e- to make a weaker claim about Federer’s
performance.
13 We also assume in this context that Maina is aware of the fact that he is not knowledgeable about the
actual rules of tennis. That is, we assume that Maina is aware of his own ignorance. If Maina were to
mistakenly believe that he is an expert on tennis, he could then felicitously utter ga- in the context in
(14).
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3.2 Embedding and shifting
Some evidentials have been argued to operate at the speech act level as illocutionary
operators (Faller 2002; Murray 2010). These illocutionary evidentials typically resist
embedding. We find, however, that Logooli e- and ga- can both embed and shift.
This is compatible with our treatment of e- and ga- as choice functions over sets of
possible worlds, as opposed to speech act level illocutionary operators:
(15) Context: Sira has not seen Imali, but has heard through a secondhand source
that she is sick. However, the speaker has seen Imali, and they think that she
looks sick. Sira tells the speaker that according to this secondhand source, it
appears that Imali is sick. (That is: the speaker has direct evidence for P, and
the subject has indirect evidence for P.) The speaker can report:
a. Sira
1Sira
a-ganagan-a
1-think-FV
ndee
that
e-ror-ek-a
9-look-AC-FV
ndee
that
Imali
1Imali
ne
COP
mu-rwaye
1-sick
‘Sira thinks that it appears that Imali is sick’
b. # Sira
1Sira
a-ganagan-a
1-think-FV
ndee
that
ga-ror-ek-a
6-look-AC-FV
ndee
that
Imali
1Imali
ne
COP
mu-rwaye
1-sick
‘Sira thinks that it appears that Imali is sick’
In (15), the speaker can felicitously utter e- despite the fact that they have direct
evidence for P (i.e., evidence that would typically license the use of ga-). This use
of e- has therefore been shifted; it is interpreted relative to the modal base of the
matrix subject, rather than of the speaker.14
Conversely, in (16) below, the speaker can felicitously utter ga- despite the fact
that they do not have direct evidence for P. This use of ga- reflects the modal base
of the matrix subject, rather than the speaker:
(16) Context: Sira has seen Imali, and tells the speaker that he thinks that Imali
looks sick. The speaker has not seen Imali. (That is: the speaker has indirect
evidence for P, and the subject has direct evidence for P.) The speaker can
report:
a. # Sira
1Sira
a-ganagan-a
1-think-FV
ndee
that
e-ror-ek-a
9-look-AC-FV
ndee
that
Imali
1Imali
ne
COP
mu-rwaye
1-sick
‘Sira thinks that it appears that Imali is sick’
14 Our consultant noted that ga- could be felicitous in (15) only if the speaker considers the source of
Sira’s information to be unreliable. The use of e- here reflects that Sira, not the speaker, does not
consider the source to be reliable.
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b. Sira
1Sira
a-ganagan-a
1-think-FV
ndee
that
ga-ror-ek-a
6-look-AC-FV
ndee
that
Imali
1Imali
ne
COP
mu-rwaye
1-sick
‘Sira thinks that it appears that Imali is sick’
Therefore, when e- or ga- is embedded under an attitude verb like kuganagana
‘to think,’ their use reflects the knowledge state of the local attitude holder, and not
of the speaker. That is, e- and ga- can shift. We note that this parallels data on
English modals, which also shift when embedded:
(17) Howard thinks that Sarah {must / should / might} go to London, but I
disagree.
3.3 Unavailability of e- and ga- in combination with non-modal verbs
In (11), we proposed that the choice function associated with e- and ga- is of type
< st,st >. Given this semantic type, the choice function must combine with a verb
that supplies a modal base. e- and ga- therefore should be unable to combine with
verbs that do not supply a modal base.
This prediction is borne out by the Logooli data. The agreement morphemes
cannot grammatically combine with any non-modal verbs. For instance, e- and ga-
cannot combine with weather verbs, as shown in (18) below. This differs from the
English expletive subject it, which can grammatically co-occur with non-modal
verbs, as shown in (19):
(18) a. riova
5sun
ri-val-a
5-shine-FV
Prompt: ‘It is sunny’
Literally: ‘The sun is shining’
b. * {e- / ga-}
9- / 6-
val-a
shine-FV
Intended: ‘It is sunny’
(19) It is raining outside.
We note that the data in (18) does not preclude the existence of a genuine
expletive morpheme in Logooli. However, we have not yet found any such item, and
neither e- nor ga- can serve this function.
3.4 Non-speaker orientation
In subsection 1.2, we described data in which the speaker uses e- or ga- to sig-
nal whether the embedded proposition P is “privileged” knowledge or “general”
knowledge, respectively. We propose that the classification of P as “privileged” or
“general” knowledge depends on the group of individuals that the speaker “asso-
ciates” themselves with, or speaks on behalf of (cf. Moltmann (2006, 2012)). That
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is, when a speaker reports that P is widely known, they are expressing that P is
widely known among the group of individuals that they speak on behalf of.
This group can vary contextually. We therefore predict that in the right context,
the speaker can use ga- to report “widely known” information that is only “widely
known” in certain communities, or even that the speaker themselves might not
believe. This prediction is supported by the following example:
(20) Context: A scientist visits a village where everyone believes that the world
is flat. Although the scientist himself doesn’t believe that the world is flat,
and many people outside the village do not think that the world is flat, he
can felicitously state:
ga-ganagan-aN-w-a
9-think-PROG-PASS-FV
yeeno
here
ndee
that
ri-lova
5-world
ri-a
5-COP
bameka
flat
‘It’s (widely) thought here that the world is flat’
In this context, the scientist reports what people in the village generally think,
not what he thinks, or what other people outside of the village think. That is, the
use of ga- in (20) reflects the modal bases and ordering sources of the people in the
village, not of the scientist.
We take this data as further evidence against an analysis of e- and ga- as eviden-
tials. The data in (20) shows that these morphemes can be non-speaker-oriented;
however, evidentials are typically strongly speaker-oriented, and resist shifting (cf.
the data in subsection 3.2) (Aikhenvald 2004; Sauerland & Schenner 2007)).
3.5 Scalar alternatives and continuations
In 2, we proposed that e- and ga- form a scale in which ga- is a stronger scalar
alternative to e-: 〈e-, ga-〉. As a result, we predict that these morphemes should
pattern like other scalar items with respect to the availability of continuations.
A weaker scalar item can be strengthened to a stronger scalar item through an
overt continuation introduced by in fact. This continuation presupposes the truth
of the prejacent, and asserts an additional proposition, which may strengthen the
prejacent. However, an assertion containing a strong scalar item cannot be followed
by an in fact continuation with a weaker scalar item; the weaker scalar item cannot
be true if in fact presupposes that the stronger item is also true. We show this data in
(21) below with the English quantifiers 〈some, all〉:
(21) a. X Vince ate some of the cookies... in fact, he ate all of the cookies.
b. # Vince ate all of the cookies... in fact, he ate some of the cookies.
We observe similar behavior with respect to the Logooli expletives. An utterance
containing e- can be felicitously followed by a continuation with ga-, as in (22a);
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however, an utterance with ga- cannot felicitously be followed by a continuation
with e-, as in (22b):
(22) a. e-ror-ek-a
9-look-AC-FV
ndee
that
Sira
1Sira
a-ze-e...
1-go-FV
naandio
in.fact
ga-ror-ek-a
6-look-AC-FV
ndee
that
Sira
1Sira
a-ze-e
1-go-FV
‘It looks like Sira left... in fact, it (really) looks like Sira left.’
b. # ga-ror-ek-a
6-look-AC-FV
ndee
that
Sira
1Sira
a-ze-e...
1-go-FV
naandio
in.fact
e-ror-ek-a
9-look-AC-FV
ndee
that
Sira
1Sira
a-ze-e
1-go-FV
# ‘It (really) looks like Sira left... in fact, it looks like Sira left.’
This pattern is expected if e- is a weaker scalar item than ga-.
3.6 Preliminary prediction: Challengeability
Like RMD, we predict that the Logooli morphemes form part of the propositional
content of an utterance. We predict therefore that the contribution of these mor-
phemes can be overtly challenged in the discourse. In doing so, a discourse partici-
pant challenges the basis by which the other speaker has restricted the set of best
possible worlds in which P is true; that is, the other speaker’s choice function.
We find that this prediction is borne out by our data, suggesting that e- and
ga- are included within the propositional content of an utterance. However, we
additionally find that only e- assertions can be challenged in this way. A Logooli
speaker can use ga- to challenge an e- assertion, but cannot use e- to challenge a ga-
assertion. We show this contrast in (23-24) below:
(23) a. Context: Sira, Kageha, and Maina are eating dinner. Sira got up and left
his plate on the table. Some time has passed, and he hasn’t yet returned.
Noticing Sira’s abandoned plate of food on the table, Kageha says:
e-ror-ek-a
9-look-AC-FV
ndee
that
Sira
1Sira
a-zi-e
1-go-FV
‘It (kind of) looks like Sira left.’
b. Maina also notices that Sira’s coat, hat, and car are gone. He responds:
yago
10that
ne
COP
agirigare
10truth
daave.
NEG
ga-ror-ek-a
6-look-AC-FV
ndee
that
Sira
1Sira
a-zi-e
1-go-FV
‘That’s not true. It (really) looks like Sira left.’
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Here, Maina contradicts the strength of Kageha’s assertion containing e-. In the
context in (23), this is understood as challenging the strength of Kageha’s evidence
for P. Maina finds that there is enough evidence to use ga- to make the strong claim
that Sira has left, as opposed to the weaker claim made with e- in Kageha’s initial
assertion.
Conversely, an utterance containing ga- cannot be challenged with an utterance
containing e-:
(24) Context: Sira’s coat is not on the coat rack. Kageha thinks this means that
Sira has left, because Sira always wears his coat when he leaves the house.
Kageha says:
a. ga-ror-ek-a
6-look-AC-FV
ndee
that
Sira
1Sira
a-zi-e
1-go-FV
‘It (really) looks like Sira left.’
b. However, Maina knows that sometimes Sira likes to wear his coat inside
the house. Maina responds:
# yago
10that
ne
COP
agirigare
10truth
daave.
NEG
e-ror-ek-a
9-look-AC-FV
ndee
that
Sira
1Sira
a-zi-e
1-go-FV
‘That’s not true. It (kind of) looks like Sira left.’15
We propose that this pattern falls out from our assumption of the scalar alter-
natives in 2 and the scalar implicature which pragmatically strengthens assertions
including e-. We assume that the Logooli utterance yago ne agirigare daave ‘that’s
not true’ targets this pragmatic strengthening. By uttering ‘that’s not true’ in (23b),
Maina challenges the pragmatic strengthening of the assertion that Kageha makes
with e- in (23a). This can then be followed by an assertion containing ga-, which is
logically compatible with (unstrengthened) e-.
Conversely, utterances containing ga- cannot be pragmatically strengthened;
ga- has no stronger scalar alternative. As a result, the use of yago ne agirigare
daave ‘that’s not true’ is infelicitous in (24), since it cannot target any operation of
pragmatic strengthening.16
15 Note also that it’s not necessary for either Kageha or Maina to have seen Sira in this context. Rather,
the choice of e- or ga- is determined purely by what is known about Sira’s general behavior, coupled
with the other visual evidence that the speakers have for P.
16 The utterance yago ne agirigare daave ‘that’s not true’ can also challenge non-scalar assertions:
(i) a. i-mbwa
9-dog
ne
COP
i-siru
9-brown
‘The dog is brown.’
b. yago
10that
ne
COP
agirigare
10truth
daave.
NEG
i-mbwa
9-dog
ne
COP
i-mwamu
9-black
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3.7 Preliminary prediction: Raising
When the use of an expletive morpheme is precluded, the meaning is equivalent to
that of ga-. That is, in the absence of a choice function, the default interpretation is
simply that of universal quantification over the best possible worlds in the modal
base. In Logooli, this arises in hyper-raising/copy-raising constructions.17 In these
constructions, an overt referential subject appears as the subject of the main verb,
rather than either of the expletive agreement markers, as in (25a) below:
(25) Context: You hear Imali coughing and sneezing.
a. Imali
Imali
a-hol-ek-a
1-hear-AC-FV
kuresia
like
ne
COP
mu-rwaye
1-sick
‘Imali sounds like she’s sick.’
b. ga-hol-ek-a
6-hear-AC-FV
kuresia
like
Imali
1Imali
ne
COP
mu-rwaye
1-sick
‘It sounds like Imali is sick.’
c. # e-hol-ek-a
9-hear-AC-FV
kuresia
like
Imali
1Imali
ne
COP
mu-rwaye
1-sick
‘It sounds like Imali is sick.’
Default universal quantification has been proposed for other constructions; for
instance, conditionals are typically proposed to have default universal quantification
over the antecedent (Kratzer 1991). It is also reflected in cross-linguistic data; RMD
report that St’át’imcets speakers prefer a default universal strength interpretation of
St’át’imcets modals. Furthermore, Gillon (2006) reports that Skwxwú7mesh speak-
ers prefer a default identity function interpretation of the choice function introduced
by Skwxwú7mesh determiners. Although we currently do not have an explanation
‘That’s not true. The dog is black.’
At present, it is an open question as to why this utterance is infelicitous in combination with
unstrengthened scalar items. However, we note that this is similar to English data. (2b) below is
infelicitous without the inclusion of the scalar particle only, or without focus intonation on the scalar
item some:
(ii) a. Leroy ate all of the cookies.
b. # That’s not true, he ate some of the cookies.
17 Hyper-raising is A-movement of the subject out of a finite embedded clause. This differs from
copy-raising, which involves a pronominal subject in the embedded clause that is co-referential
with the subject of the main verb (e.g., Howard seemed like he enjoyed the concert) (Diercks 2012;
Halpert 2012; Carstens & Diercks 2012). Since Logooli, like other Bantu languages, is pro-drop,
differentiating between the two constructions can be difficult.
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for why the default interpretation of (25a) should be universal quantification, we
note that this is in line with several other proposals.
Further support for this proposal comes from dialectal variation in Logooli.
Mountjoy-Venning & Diercks (2016) report that for some Logooli speakers, hyper-
raising and the ga- agreement marker can co-occur. They refer to these constructions
as instances of “non-agreeing raising,” as in (26) below. In this construction, the
matrix verb lacks the expected class 10 subject agreement zi-; instead, ga- occurs on
the matrix verb:18
(26) zi-Nombe
10-cow
ga-ror-ek-a
6-look-AC-FV
(ndee)
(that)
zi-r-ii
10-eat-PAST
‘The cows seem to have eaten’
(Mountjoy-Venning & Diercks 2016, ex. (4); their translation)
Since the subject of (25a) is in fact the noun ziNombe ‘cows’ (as shown by
Mountjoy-Venning & Diercks 2016), we must account for how the < st,st > argu-
ment of the modal verb is saturated. We assume that in such non-agreeing raising
constructions, the modal verb combines with an additional phonologically null argu-
ment of type < st,st >. This morpheme contributes the same semantics as ga-, i.e.,
universal quantification over the best possible worlds.19
4 Conclusion and further puzzles
In this paper, we have argued that the Logooli morphemes e- and ga- introduce
choice functions that combine with a universally quantified modal base. These
choice functions select a subset of the best possible worlds of this modal base, and
differ in the size of the subset they select. Luragooli speakers use e- and ga- to make
weak and strong assertions, respectively, about the embedded proposition P; their
interpretation is dependent on contextual factors such as the information state of the
speaker and the group of individuals that the speaker “associates” with. Our Logooli
data can be accounted for with a similar analysis to RMD’s account for modality and
evidentiality in St’át’imcets. This provides additional evidence for the proposal that
modality and evidentiality are not distinct categories (argued by e.g., RMD, Palmer
1986, among others, contra e.g., de Haan 1999).
There is a great deal of puzzling data on e- and ga- that remains to be investigated.
For instance, some Logooli verbs that introduce modal bases can occur only with
18 Only ga- is licensed in this construction; e- cannot occur.
19 Alternatively, we could stipulate that Logooli modal verbs have two lexical entries: one that occurs
with e- and ga-, and one that occurs with overt referential subjects in non-agreeing raising construc-
tions and does not involve quantification over possible worlds. We have no strong objections to this
latter analysis; both approaches are equally stipulative.
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one of the two agreement morphemes; the perception verbs kufunya ‘to smell’/‘to
taste’ and kuholeka ‘to feel’ are only compatible with e-.20 Conversely, the emotive
factive kugaasa ‘to be perfect’ is only compatible with ga-. At present, we have no
explanation as to why these restrictions occur.
Furthermore, preliminary fieldwork in Kenya suggests that there is a great deal
of speaker variation with respect to the use and interpretation of these morphemes
in Logooli. At present, it appears that this variation may be areal, although this
hypothesis remains to be confirmed. In addition to establishing the facts regarding
e- and ga- in Logooli, we are also interested in investigating similar expletive mor-
phemes in other Luhia languages, and in Bantu more generally. We are particularly
interested in establishing the modal facts for languages that have a greater number
of these morphemes, such as Lubukusu and Wanga.
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